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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in dismissing Appellants' claims for wrongful lien and 
slander of title because UDOT's Notice of Interest clearly encumbered the Kapposes' full 
use and enjoyment of their home and real property rights. Further, the Court should 
allow for the constitutional issues to be addressed fully on their merits. Finally, Rule 4 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure automatically extends the time to appeal until the 
trial court made a decision on Appellants' Rule 59 Motion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE'S NOTICE OF INTEREST ON THE KAPPOS PROPERTY 
WAS A WRONGFUL LIEN AND A SLANDER OF TITLE. 
UDOT's main defense on the merits is that the trial court properly determined that 
UDOT's Notice of Interest recorded with regard to the Kappos residence was not a "lien" 
or "encumbrance". Such a conclusion is erroneous and nonsensical. Clearly, the UDOT 
Notice of Interest was a significant detriment on the Kapposes' use and enjoyment of the 
real property while the Notice of Interest was pending against their real property. In 
addition, it is undisputed that as a result of the Notice of Interest recorded on January 19, 
2006, the Kapposes were unable to sell their property, and were unable to refinance the 
property including no ability to access any of the equity in their property. R. 131-32, 
Affidavit of Mala Kappos ff 10-1L UDOT told Mala Kappos that it was seeking to evict 
the Kappos family from their home. R. 131-33, Affidavit of Mala Kappos fflf 12-17. 
UDOT has submitted no information disputing the foregoing evidence. 
The Notice of Interest was completely groundless because the State had lost its 
right to the property by failing to first record its condemnation order prior to the 
recording of the Ed Green and Ed Green Construction conveyances. R. 184-86. The 
significant passage of time and its own failure to record the condemnation order put 
UDOT on notice that its property rights had been lost. The recording of the Notice of 
Interest was therefore spiteful, not to mention wrongful. The trial court erred in 
determining that the Notice of Interest was not a wrongful lien and not a slander of title 
for which this Court should remand. 
The State also has not opposed the information contained in the Affidavit of Mala 
Kappos which states that the first time that she knew anything about the States allegations 
concerning her residence was when a UDOT representative came to her home. R. 131-33. 
Ms. Kappos further stated that UDOT threatened that the State would evict them from 
their home unless the Kapposes achieved a settlement with UDOT. R. 131-33. The fact 
that UDOT had recorded a Notice of Interest and had threatened to evict the Kapposes 
from the property is sufficient to show that their Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien. 
UDOT's Notice of Interest has clearly interrupted the use and enjoyment of Mark 
and Mala Kappos of the subject property. The Kapposes were wholly unable to sell the 
property and to refinance the property as a result of the Notice of Interest recorded by the 
State of Utah. R.144, R.769-70. 
The District Court and UDOT have concluded that the Notice of Interest recorded 
against the Kappos property is not a lien or an encumbrance. The State asserts that an 
encumbrance "is defined as any interest in a third person consistent with a title in fee in 
the grantee, if such outstanding interest injuriously effects the value of the property." 
Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp. 791 P.2d 183, 186 (Utah 1990). Clearly, UDOT is 
asserting an ownership interest in the property equivalent to a fee title in the State 
pursuant to a condemnation award from many years ago. This is inconsistent with title in 
fee in the Kapposes and has injuriously affected the value of their property. The State 
should not be able to record such notices at its leisure. 
An encumbrance has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as: "any right a 
third party holds in land which constitutes a burden or limitation upon the rights of the 
fee title holder." See, Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984). In 
addition, the recent case of Gardiner v. York, 233 P.3d 500 (Utah App. 2010) discusses 
and cites favorably the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary, 547(7th Ed. 1999) which 
states that an encumbrance is a "claim or liability that is attached to property or some 
other right that might lessen its value, such as a lien or mortgage". Id. at 508. See also, 
Vestin Mortgage, Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 139 P.3d 1055, 1058 (Utah 2006). 
Under these definitions, UDOT's notice of interest on the Kappos property was a burden, 
limitation, and a claim that lessened the value of their property. 
According to Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-l(6)(2005) "wrongful lien" means "any 
document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owners interest in certain 
real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this 
chapter or another state or federal statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or authorized 
pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real property." 
Under the above-mentioned statute., UDOT's Notice of Interest constituted a 
wrongful lien because it was not expressly authorized by state or federal statute, was not 
authorized by an order of the court and was not authorized by the Kapposes. There is no 
order of any court allowing for the recording of UDOT's Notice of Interest, and UDOT 
had lost its interest obtained by way of the previous order of condemnation which was 
entered approximately 29 years earlier. 
The State has since released its Notice of Interest which is further evidence that it 
never had a valid claim in and to the property. The claim of the State of Utah should 
never have been recorded as a Notice of Interest. UDOT also asserts that at the time it 
recorded the Notice of Interest there were competing claims to the property - claims that 
had not been resolved. However, UDOT has obtained no ruling from the court resolving 
the claim. UDOT has just recognized the error of its ways in recording the Notice of 
Interest and has thus released the Notice of Interest. The Notice of Interest itself was not 
authorized by the condemnation judgment and therefore, is a wrongful lien. The 
condemnation judgment itself had already been recorded and the attempt by UDOT to 
add an additional recorded document to the Kappos property was wrongful. 
The State cites to Birch v. Myers (also titled In re Estate of Myers) for the 
proposition that a Notice of Interest does not constitute a wrongful lien when based on an 
existing property right even if that right is subject to total divestment. See, In re Estate of 
Myers, 214 P.3d 115 (Utah App. 2009). However the Birch v. Myers case is very 
different to the facts of this case. The main distinction with the Birch case is it discusses 
present and future interest in property. The Utah Court of Appeals determined that a 
notice of interest recorded based upon a trust instrument granting a future interest which 
had the potential of total divestment was not a wrongful lien. But in the matter now 
before the Court, UDOT did not have a "present" or a "future" interest in the Kappos 
property by virtue of the condemnation judgment Rather, UDOT had a "past" interest in 
the property. The UDOT interest expired when Ed Green Construction recorded its deeds 
on the property before UDOT recorded its condemnation judgment. At that point the 
burden shifted to UDOT to prove that Ed Green Construction and Ed Green were not 
bona fide purchasers for value with regard to the property. The presumption under Utah 
Code Annotated § 57-3-103[ was that the property belonged to the Kapposes free and 
clear of any interest of any other party including the State of Utah. The State of Utah had 
the burden to prove that the Kapposes' predecessor in interest - Ed Green Construction -
was not a bona fide purchaser for value. UDOT did not even attempt to prove that. 
Instead, UDOT recorded a Notice of Interest without attempting to determine those 
issues. If they were uncertain, the State of Utah should have filed an action against the 
Kapposes and asked the court for permission to record a document based upon the facts. 
UDOT did not have the authority to unilaterally decide for itself that it had an interest in 
the property when clearly that interest had expired by its own failure to record. UDOT's 
failure to record the condemnation judgment prior to the recording by Ed Green and Ed 
Green Construction is prima facie evidence that UDOT had lost its right to the property. 
1 Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-103: Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the 
property in good faith and for a valuable consideration; and (2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly 
recorded. 
Of course, UDOT did not have superior rights because had the State had such superior 
rights the State would not have unilaterally released the Notice of Interest in 2008. 
The State's analysis of Russell v. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244 (Utah App. 2000) is 
incorrect. In the Russell case the Court determined that the Notice of Interest was 
wrongful because a contract right was not an interest in real property. The State asserts 
that UDOT did have an interest in the Kappos property but fails to define the nature and 
scope of that interest. In fact, UDOT did not have an interest in the Kapposes' property 
because they had lost it for failure to record in a timely manner. The alleged interest of 
UDOT was nonexistent in this case to the same level that it was nonexistent in the 
Russell v. Thomas matter. Therefore, the Notice of Interest recorded against the 
Kapposes' property is just as wrongful as the notice of interest in the Russell v. Thomas 
matter. 
The withdrawal of the Notice of Interest in 2008 does not cure the State's 
problem. R.761. The State should never have recorded the Notice of Interest. During 
the time that the Notice of Interest had been recorded significant damages were caused to 
the Appellants. The Kapposes lost a sale of the property during the time when the market 
was at its highest. Now that the real estate market is much lower, the Kapposes cannot 
sell the property for nearly as high of value as they would have been able to do so 
pursuant to the contract which was signed in 2007 and which was lost as a result of the 
State's Notice of Interest. R.768-70. This resulted in a significant loss in equity. R.768-
70. 
Based upon all of the above, this Court should determine that the Notice of 
Interest by UDOT against the Kappos property was a wrongful lien and a slander of title 
and reinstate the claims based thereon. Plaintiffs have been severely damaged by the 
arbitrary conduct of the State of Utah in recording the Notice of Interest on their property 
defeating a sale thereof. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS' 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS. 
The State of Utah, Department of Transportation has not addressed in its brief the 
fact that the District Court abused its discretion in not entertaining Appellants' claims 
under the United States and the Utah constitutions for unconstitutional taking of their 
property. The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution prohibit the taking of 
property by the government without paying just compensation. The Unites States 
Constitution, Amendment V states in part as follows, "...nor shall public property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation." The Constitution of Utah Article I 
Section 22 states, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without 
just compensation." The State of Utah wrongful took the Kapposes' property for the 
period of time that the Notice of Interest had been recorded on their property and 
deprived them of essential elements of the right, use, and enjoyment of real property for 
that extended period of time. 
This is supported by Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1995), which 
states that the takings provisions of the Utah Constitution protects all types of private 
property that are protected by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. 
at 1098. Moreover, the framers of the constitutional provision that private property shall 
not be taken or damages for public use without just compensation did not intend to give 
rights and then leave citizens powerless to enforce such rights. 
The right to alienate property is a cognizable property interest. "Indeed, in Utah 
'[t]here is an important interest for property owners to possess unencumbered titles . . . 
[because] public policy [favors] certainty in title to real property, . . . to protect bona fide 
purchasers and to avoid conflicts of ownership, which may engender needless litigation." 
See, Alvey Development Corp. v. Mackelprang, 51 P.3d 45, 50 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
UDOT acted recklessly and carelessly when it recorded the Notice of Interest. UDOT 
recorded the Notice of Interest without notifying Plaintiffs that it had been recorded. 
The constitutional claims were properly before the trial court and should never 
have been dismissed or at least should have been reinstated. This Court should order the 
trial court to hear these claims on their merits and determine the amount of damages 
suffered by the Kapposes as a result of the unconstitutional conduct of the State of Utah 
in regards thereto. 
In summary, the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as the 
Utah Constitution do not allow for takings of real property without just compensation. 
The trial court should have never dismissed the constitutional claims or should have at 
least reinstated them when requested. Therefore, this Court should remand the 
constitutional questions to the trial court for disposition and determination of damages. 
III. UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, RULE 4(B) 
AUTOMATICALLY EXTENDED THE TIME TO APPEAL UNTIL 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE A DECISION ON APPELLANTS' RULE 
59 MOTION. 
UDOT has asked the Court to dismiss this appeal based upon the argument that 
this appeal is untimely. UDOT argues that the final order dismissing the last of 
Appellants' claims was entered on January 4, 2010 and that an appeal should have been 
filed within 30 days from the date of that order. This argument fails based upon U.R.A.P. 
4(b). 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(b) specifically governs this situation: 
If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the 
time for all parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the 
order disposing of the motion:.... (b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;... 
Thus, because Appellants filed their Rule 59 Motion on January 6, 2010, Appellants 
automatically enjoy the extension of the appeal time pursuant to Rule 4(b). Rule 4(b) is 
not limited to those motions which are successful. Rather, it is broad rule regarding 
appeals which allows for the filing of a notice of appeal after all matters in the case have 
been completed. Because the trial court had dismissed one of Appellants' claims without 
prejudice, there was not a final adjudication of all issues between the parties. Moreover, 
it was not only allowable for Appellants to ask the court to reinstate that claim, but 
prudent. Appellants were merely seeking to best serve judicial economy by not being 
required to pursue their constitutional claims in a separate case. The very purpose of 
requesting reinstatement of the claim which was dismissed without prejudice was to 
prevent separate lawsuits. Unfortunately the trial court determined not to handle the 
constitutional claims within the context of this matter and basically forced that issue to a 
separate case. While it may have been within the court's discretion to make that ruling, it 
should not be held against Appellants for attempting to provide for judicial economy by 
filing their Rule 59(e) Motion. Plaintiffs relied specifically upon U.R.A.P. 4(b) when 
filing that motion and should be allowed the benefit of it. Rule 4(b) is an absolute right 
for a party to file a motion under Rule 59(e) to be allowed an automatic extension for the 
time to appeal. The Rule 59(e) Motion was disposed of by way of the trial court's order 
dated March 30, 2010. Therefore, the appeal time began to run on March 30, 2010. 
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on April 27, 2010 appealing from several 
substantive rulings entered in this case prior to the final order. The appeal was therefore 
timely filed. 
The case law cited by UDOT with regard to its appellate brief does not mandate a 
ruling in UDOT's favor on this issue. In Nichols v. State, the Utah Supreme Court stated, 
"after an order of dismissal, the Plaintiff must move under Rules 59(e) or 60(b) to reopen 
the judgment." See, Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231, 232 (Utah 1976). That is exactly 
what Appellants did in this case-they invoked Rule 59 in a timely fashion asking the trial 
court to reinstate their constitutional claim which had been dismissed without prejudice. 
Because the assigned Judge was already familiar with all of the facts and procedure, he 
was in the best position to handle the constitutional issues. The requested result would 
have promoted judicial economy in that it was an attempt to keep the case as one rather 
than to have piecemeal cases and to have potential multiple appeals. Even though the 
trial court disagreed with Appellants on that issue, Appellants should not be penalized for 
not filing an earlier appeal after relying upon Rule 4(b) Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
The State also cites to Steiner v. State, 495 P.2d 809 (Utah 1972). In that case, the 
trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. Without filing 
a Rule 59(e) motion the plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint and requested a 
re-hearing on the dismissal. That is not the procedure of the case before the Court. The 
Kapposes filed their motion to alter or amend two days after the dismissal order and 
asked the Court for permission to reinstate their previously dismissed claim which had 
been dismissed without prejudice. Thus, the Steiner case is not dispositive of the 
timeliness issue. The procedural facts are very different. The Steiner Court made a 
specific note that the plaintiffs in that case had no filed a motion to alter or amend. In 
this case, such a motion, a Rule 59(e) Motion was filed and therefore Plaintiffs properly 
preserved their rights. Similarly, the State also cites to Suarez v. Friel 2005 UT App. 
396, 2005 WL 2303797 (an unreported opinion). Again, that court determined that the 
plaintiff must move under Rule 59(e) or 60(b) to reopen a judgment which is exactly the 
request made by the Kapposes to reinstate their previously dismissed cause of action. 
The Rule 59(e) motion is entitled Motion to Amend/Reinstate Complaint to 
Include Constitutional Claims and that motion was specifically brought pursuant to Rule 
59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requesting that the trial court alter or amend 
its previous ruling of dismissal of the constitutional claim. Appellants were asking the 
court to reinstate their constitutional claims which had previously been dismissed without 
prejudice. There was no final adjudication of this case until Appellants' timely Rule 
11 
59(e) motion was decided. The trial court denied that request, but it is a valid post-
judgment motion sufficient to extend the time for appeal. The Rule 59 Motion was filed 
in a timely manner because it was filed within ten (10) days of entry of the judgment and 
requested that the trial court reinstate the constitutional takings claim had been dismissed, 
but not dismissed with prejudice. In fact, the trial court had recently entertained an 
argument by the Appellee to convert the dismissal from "without prejudice" to "with 
prejudice", but the court denied that request. Therefore, it was more than appropriate that 
Appellants should have been allowed the opportunity to reinstate their claim. The trial 
court gave consideration to the request for reinstatement but unfortunately denied it. 
In this situation, Appellants actually had a constitutional claim pending which had 
been acknowledged by the trial court. However, the trial court had dismissed that cause 
of action without prejudice. Thus, the "without prejudice" ruling meant that the trial 
court determined that Appellants could restate that claim at another date. Appellants 
were merely attempting to reinstate that claim as soon as the other pending issues were 
resolved by the trial court and that did not occur until January 4, 2010. Thus, within the 
ten (10) days allowable under Rule 59 and invoking Rule 59, Appellants requested that 
the trial court reopen the judgment and reinstate that claim. Thus, having invoked Rule 
59 for a legitimate reason consistent with the procedural posture of the case, this Court 
should find that UDOT's request to dismiss the appeal is without basis and that 
Appellants' time for appeal began on March 30, 2010. 
The result of UDOT's procedural position would be to put parties in an 
irreconcilable predicament because of the possibility of filing a premature notice of 
appeal which does not confer jurisdiction on appellate courts. See, Anderson v. 
Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah App. 1988). Had the trial court granted Appellants' 
Rule 59(e) Motion, then a notice of appeal filed prior to entry of the order disposing of 
that motion would have been moot and would not have conferred jurisdiction on the 
appellate courts. 
In summary, UDOTs request to dismiss this appeal based upon the alleged 
untimeliness thereof is invalid and should be denied. Appellants had good reason for 
filing the motion which attempted to reinstate a claim that had been previously dismissed 
without prejudice, and Appellants were simply relying upon Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure which allow for extension of the time to appeal when said 
motions are filed in a timely manner. 
CONCLUSION 
UDOT's Opening Brief is limited in its scope and has requested the Court to not 
entertain this appeal based upon a timing issue. However, Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure automatically extend the time to appeal until the trial court made a 
decision on Appellants' Rule 59 Motion. With regard to the wrongful lien issue, the trial 
court should never have dismissed the claims for wrongful lien and slander of title 
because UDOT's Notice of Interest clearly encumbered the Kapposes full use and 
enjoyment of their home and real property rights. Finally, the Court should allow for the 
constitutional issues to be addressed fully on their merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 day of February, 2011. 
SMITH KN^ OWLES, P.C. 
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Attorneys for Appellants Mark and Mala Kappos 
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